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a continuance, but the court should have discretion to determine
from evidence before it whether cause exists in a particular case.
WILLIAM DYER ANDERSON
ACCOMPLICES TO ABORTIONS
Many jurisdictions, either because of statutes or the result of ju-
dicial decisions, will not sustain the conviction of the actual perpe-
trator of a crime solely on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony
of an accomplice.' In these jurisdictions, therefore, it is important
to determine who is legally an accomplice.
2
Richmond v. Commonwealth,3 decided by the Kentucky Court of
Appeals, raises the question in an abortion case. The girl's paramour
was the only witness possessing any knowledge of the abortion, aside
from the accused abortionist who did not testify. The boyfriend ad-
mitted responsibility for the girl's pregnancy. At the girl's request,
he arranged for a meeting with the abortionist and took her to the
designated meeting place. Following a brief private conversation
between the accused and the boyfriend, they all drove to the ac-
cused's trailer for the operation. The boyfriend remained in an ad-
joining room during the operation, after which the girl paid the ac-
cused. This operation proved unsuccessful, so a week later a second
operation was performed under similar circumstances. The girl, never
regaining consciousness, died as a result of the second operation.
The trial court left to the jury the question of whether the boy-
friend was an accomplice of the abortionist so that the uncorroborated
testimony of the accomplice would not support a verdict of guilty.
The jury convicted. Upon appeal, a majority of the Court of Ap-
peals held that the boyfriend was an accomplice as a matter of law.
Two judges dissented, being of the opinion that the rule requiring
iBiegun v. State, 2o6 Ga. 6M8, 58 S.E.2d 149 (1950); Fitch v. Commonwealth, 291
Ky. 748, 165 S.V.2d 558 (1942); State v. Sweeny, i8o Minn. 450, 231 N.W. 225 (193o);
see generally, 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 2056 n.1o (3d ed. 1940); Note, 54 Colum. L.
Rev. 219, 233-237 (1954).
2If the famous Rosenberg treason case had been tried in a New York state
court, where corroboration is required, a conviction would have been unlikely. Note,
54 Colum. L. Rev. 219, 234 (1954).
Where only a single witness is available to testify, the corroboration rule ple-
sents the court with an unfortunate dilemma of choosing between what may appear
to be justice on one hand and the the state's legislative policy on the other.
337o S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ky. 1963).
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corroboration should be abolished in favor of a rule simply requiring
the giving of "cautionary instructions" to the jury with respect to the
credibility of the accomplice's testimony.
There is no single satisfactory definition of an accomplice,4 and
there is a conflict of authority as to whether a distinction should
be made between an accomplice who is only a witness and an accom-
plice who is also a defendant. Where the term "accomplice" is specif-
ically applied to witnesses as by statute, some courts hold that there
is no distinction between the two,5 thus laying down an identical
offense test. This test to determine who is an accomplice is used in
the majority of states0 and involves determining whether the accused
defendant and witnesses can be indicted for the same offense. Other
courts apply a criminal corruption test 7 under which a person may be
an accomplice even though he could not be indicted as a defendant
for the same crime.8 The criminal corruption test is used in only a
small minority of states, and only requires determining whether the
witness has played a corrupt part in the unlawful act. Both the iden-
tical offense test and the criminal corruption test can be applied to
the abortee and the third party witness in determining whether they
are accomplices.
Under the identical offense test the pregnant woman soliciting
an abortion is not held to be an accomplice, because abortion statutes
are directed at persons other than the woman upon whom the act is
committed.9 The woman incurs no criminal liability, even for per-
forming the abortion upon herself.' 0
'State v. Walters, 1o5 Ore. 662, 209 Pac. 349, 352 (1922); 1 R.C.L. Accomplices §
2, at 156 (1914).
People v. Blank, 283 N.Y. 526, 29 N.E.2d 73 (1940); State v. Case, 61 Ore. 265,
122 Pac. 304 (1912); State v. Weston, 1o9 Ore. 19, 219 Pac. 18o (1923).
OPeople v. Raven, 44 Cal. 2d 523, 282 P.2d 866 (1955); Elmendorf v. Common-
wealth, 171 Ky. 410, 188 S.W. 483 (1916); State v. Tennyson, 212 Minn. 158, 2
N.W.2d 833 (1942); Dunn v. People, 29 N.Y. 523 (1864); State v. Coffey, 157 Ore.
457, 72 P.2d 35 (1937); Mayes v. State, it Okla. Crim. 61, 142 Pac. 1o49 (1914);
Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 817, 822 (1957); 9 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 19o, 191-92 (1962). In
California this test was adopted by statute in 1915. Cal. Pen. Code § 1111.
People v. Coffey, 161 Cal. 433, 119 Pac. 9o, 9o3 (ig"); People v. King, 3o
Cal. App. 2d 185, 85 P.2d 928 (1938); Fitzgerald v. State, 85 Okla. Crim. 376,
188 P.2d 396, 4o9 (1947); Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 1352 (1951).
8Chandler v. State, 89 Tex. Crim. 309, 230 S.W. 1002, 1003 (1921); People v.
Coffey, supra note 7.
"State v. Smith, 99 Iowa 26, 68 N.W. 428 (1896); Commonwealth v. Sierakow-
ski, 154 Pa. Super. 321, 35 A.2d 790 (1944); Smartt v. State, 112 Tenn. 539, 8o S.W.
586 (19o4); Miller v. Bennett, igo Va. 162, 56 S.E.2d 217 (1949).
10State v. Carey, 76 Conn. 342, 56 Ad. 632 (19o4); State v. Tennyson, supra note
6; State v. Hyer, 39 N.J.L. 598 (1877); People v. Blank, supra note 5; People v. Ved-
1964]
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Several reasons are given by the courts for excluding the abortee
under the identical offense test. Some courts say the woman is guilty
of the separate crime of soliciting an abortion.' If any other ap-
proach were followed, the woman would be guilty of two crimes,
first in submitting to or soliciting an abortion and second by acting
as an accomplice.' 2 The fact the woman might be convicted of two
offenses is not entirely convincing, at least if she can be subjected to
only a single punishment.13 Even in jurisdictions in which the woman
is not guilty of a separate crime, she is usually excluded from the
definition of an accomplice on the theory she is the "victim" rather
than the perpetrator.14
The more difficult problem is determining whether a third party
witness, i.e., a person other than the abortee or perpetrator, is an ac-
complice. Some jurisdictions use a literal or narrow interpretation
of the identical offense test, while other jurisdictions use a broad in-
terpretation.
The primary allegiance of the third party who has participated and
has knowledge15 of the abortionist's intent to perform an abortion,16
der, 98 N.Y. 630 (1885); Dunn v. People, supra note 6; Smartt v. State, supra note
io; Watson v. State, 9 Tex. App. 237 (188o); Annot., s39 A.L.R. 983 (1942).
In jurisdictions which make no distinction between co-conspirators and accom-
plices, the woman involved may be convicted of a conspiracy with others to com-
mit the abortion upon her person, even though she could not be convicted alone.
Regina v. Whitechurch, [189o 24 Q.B.D. 420.
uPeople v. Clapp, 24 Cal. 2d 835, 151 P.2d 237 (1944); People v. Wilson, 25 Cal.
2d 341, 153 P.2d 720 (1944).
The abortee is liable under N.Y. Pen. Law § 8o, and the woman has committed
the crime of submitting to an abortion under N.Y. Pen. Law § 81. Under Cal. Pen.
Code § 275 the crime is that of soliciting an abortion.
The true effect of providing separate statutory offenses for the abortee should
not be to obliterate her status as an accomplice, but to punish her for the specific
crime attributable to her.
'people v. Tennyson, supra note 6.
1N.Y. Const. art. I, § 5; N.Y. Pen. Law § 1938.
"'People v. Blank, supra note 5; People v. McGonegal, 136 N.Y. 62, 32 N.E. 616
(1892); People v. Vedder, supra note so; Dunn v. People, supra note 6.
The judicial decisions giving rise to this view probably arose from sympathy for
the female's unfortunate plight.
15Some courts take a liberal view regarding the sufficiency of evidence required
to bring the guilty knowledge home to the third party. For example, in the case of
Adams v. State, 200 Md. 133, 88 A.2d 556 (1952), an abortionist's hired secretary
and nurse, third party witnesses, were convicted of aiding and abetting their em-
ployer. Upon affirming their convictions the Court of Appeals held that k-nowl-
edge and intent could be inferred from their overall conduct. A stricter view is
found in State v. Payne, 25 Wash. 2d 407, 171 P.2d 227 (1946), where the
evidence showed a nurse had knowledge of the unlawful purpose behind the vic-
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is considered by the courts that broadly interpret the identical of-
fense test. As a means of escaping the adverse results of a broad
definition of an accomplice, some courts draw a distinction between
the witness who acts in behalf of the victim and the witness who acts
in behalf of the abortionist. Where the entire evidence relates solely
to the relationship between the witness and the victim, the courts
hold there is an absence of criminal concert of action, and the witness
is not an accomplice. In the Delaware case of Scott v. State,17 which
is indistinguishable from the Richmond case, a friend at the victim's
request contacted an abortionist, made the arrangements, accompanied
the victim to the abortionist's residence, and remained in an adjoin-
ing room during the operation. The Supreme Court held that with the
exception of the telephone call and a private conversation prior to
the operation, the evidence showed only the relationship between the
friend and the victim and did not indicate any connection between
the friend and the abortionist.
The statutes requiring corroboration of an accomplice's testimony
have generally met with a hostile reception by courts and writers
alike. While some courts have concealed their hostility by drawing a
distinction between aiding the victim and aiding the perpetrator,
others have done so by taking a narrow approach in applying the
tim's visit. The Supreme Court held the evidence was purely circumstantial and
did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the nurse also had kno, ledge of
her employer's unlawful intent.
1 Adams v. State, supra note 15; State v. Payne, supra note 15. With regards to
intent of the abortionist, see Polly v. People, 107 Colo. 6, 1o8 P.2d :22o (94o); State
v. Sturchio, 131 N.J.L. 256, 36 A.2d 3o (1944).
1749 Del. 251, 113 A.2d 88o (1955).
Upon rehearing, this case was remanded to the trial court in order to make
specific findings of fact in regard to the alleged meeting between the friend and
the abortionist. If the meeting was private in nature it would show the relationship
was between the friend and the abortionist. Scott v. State, 49 Del. 401, 117 A.2d
831 (1955).
Where the facts were similar to those in the Richmond case, the Supreme
Court of California affirmed the trial court's refusal to charge the jury that the
boyfriend was an accomplice as a matter of law. The victim's boyfriend took her
to an abortionist, paid for the operation, and assisted in administering the anesthetic.
The trial court held that such evidence did not conclusively prove that the relation-
ship of the boyfriend to the accused abortionist was that of an accomplice. People
v. Darrow, 212 Cal. 167, 298 Pac. 1 (1931).
Under similar reasoning employed in the Scott case, a court quashed an
indictment drawn from the state's abortion statute which makes it a crime to
"aid, assist or counsel any person with intent to cause an abortion." The court
held that the term "any person" did not apply to the pregnant woman. Thus a
third party counseling her was not criminally liable. State v. Parm, 21 Del. (5 Pen.)
556, 60 Ad. 977 (Ct. Gen. Sess. Del. 19o5). See also People v. Lovell, 40 Misc. 2d
458, 242 N.YS.2d 958 (Oneida County Ct. 1963).
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identical offense test. California uses a very narrow statutory definition
to describe an accomplice.' 8 In the California case of People v. Al-
varez,1 9 the District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's de-
termination that the sister and sister-in-law of the victim, third party
witnesses, were not accomplices under the identical offense test. The
sister-in-law had purchased the instrument and was present when it
was used by the abortionist. The sister admitted she had buried the
fetus and was also present during the abortion. Since neither the
sister nor the sister-in-law actually used the instrument, they were
not held to be accomplices because they were not guilty of the exact
identical offense for which the abortionist was on trial.
While California uses a narrow approach in applying the identi-
cal offense test, Kentucky uses a broad approach.20 In the Richmond
case the court found that the boyfriend had aided and abetted the
abortionist and was an accomplice under the identical offense test
even though the boyfriend had not used the abortion instruments. In
sharp contrast is the Alverez case where the participants, who clearly
aided and abetted the abortionist, were held not to be accomplices
because they did not actually use the abortion instruments.
Under the criminal corruption test, which is the minority view,
the abortee and third party witnesses may be accomplices. 21 The crim-
inal corruption test represents the common law view and was suc-
cinctly stated by Judge Henshaw in People v. Coffey,22 saying, "This,
then, is the true test and rule: If in any crime the participation of an
individual has been criminally corrupt, he is an accomplice. '23 Those
who favor using the criminal corruption test argue that it is the part
""An accomplice is hereby defined as one who is liable to prosecution for the
identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the
testimony of the accomplice is given." Cal. Pen. Code § 111 i.
Prior to 1915 California used the very broad common law concept of participes-
criminis in defining an accomplice. Because of the sweeping nature of such a defini-
tion, exceptions were often made out of necessity, rather than from reason, in
order to prevent obvious injustices. As a result of inadequacies of the common law
definition, the California legislature enacted a statute narrowly defining an ac-
complice. See State v. Coffey, supra note 6.
2'73 Cal. App. 2d 528, 166 P.2d 896 (1946).
2°Head v. Commonwealth, 310 S.W.2d 285 (Ky. 1958). A person is guilty of the
identical offense under Kentucky law, if the evidence showing participation in
or connection with the same offense is sufficient to convict that person either as a
principal or as an aider and abettor.
"Trent v. State, 15 Ala. App. 485, 73 So. 834 (1916); see also People v. Mur-
phy, ioi N.Y. 126, 130, 4 N.E. 326 (1886) (dictum); State v. McCoy, 52 Ohio St.
157, 39 N.E. 316 (1894); Wells v. New Eng. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 191 Pa. 207, 43 Atl.
126 (1899), involving civil liability.
nSupra note 7.
2Id. at 9o7.
